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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











WINDSTREAM COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
_____________ 
    
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of  Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court  No. 2-09-cv-00946 
United States Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Robert C. Mitchell 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2011 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  May 25, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Michael Swartz brings this action for overtime pay and unlawful age 
discrimination against his former employer, Windstream Communications, Inc. 
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(“Windstream”).  The Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment in 
Windstream’s favor.1  Swartz appeals.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Windstream is a telecommunications company whose affiliates provide 
telecom services in sixteen states.  Swartz was employed by Windstream (or its 
predecessor) as a Sales Engineer II.  In that capacity, he custom-designed 
telecommunications platforms for Windstream’s clients.  Swartz was terminated on 
June 20, 2008 as the result of a corporate reorganization.  He was sixty-one years 
of age at the time. 
 Swartz filed a complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania 
approximately one year later.  He claimed that his termination was the product of 
age discrimination—a violation of both the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq.  Swartz also argued that he was 
entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seq.  After a period of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The Magistrate Judge denied Swartz’s motion, but granted the motion 
filed by Windstream.  Swartz timely appealed.  The Magistrate Judge exercised 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 
                                                 
1 The parties consented to have the Magistrate Judge conduct all pretrial and trial proceedings 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
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28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II 
 We review the Magistrate Judge’s decision to grant summary judgment de 
novo and apply the same standard the Magistrate Judge was required to apply.  
Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Lamont v. New Jersey, --- F.3d ---, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104, at *8 (3d Cir. 
Mar. 4, 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 
 Swartz first claims that his termination was the product of unlawful age 
discrimination.
2
  Our analysis of this claim is governed by the framework set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Smith v. City of 
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, Swartz must shoulder the initial burden to make out a prima facie case 
of discrimination.  Smith, 589 F.3d at 689.  If he is able to do so, the burden of 
production shifts to Windstream to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for its employment decision.  Id.  Should Windstream meet its burden, the 
presumption of discriminatory action is rebutted and Swartz must show that 
                                                 
2 Swartz raises age discrimination claims under the ADEA and PHRA.  We address these claims 
collectively because the same legal standard applies to both.  Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 
463, 466 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Windstream’s stated reasons are pretextual.  Id.  The Magistrate Judge held that 
Swartz failed at the first McDonnell Douglas step.  We are not so sure.  Our 
uncertainty is of no moment, however, for even if Swartz had made out a prima 
facie case, it was rebutted by Windstream.  The record shows that Swartz’s 
principal focus was in “voice” systems; that the demand for “voice” systems had 
fallen off significantly; that Swartz declined to obtain training in an alternate 
practice area; and that Swartz ultimately was terminated as part of a corporate 
reorganization.  Swartz failed to come forth with sufficient evidence to prove that 
these reasons were pretextual.  His claim cannot withstand scrutiny under 
McDonnell Douglas, and the Magistrate Judge properly dismissed it. 
 Swartz’s second claim arises under the FLSA, which entitles most 
employees who work in excess of forty hours per week to overtime pay.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 207.  The FLSA’s overtime provision does not apply, however, to “any employee 
employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity.”  Id. § 
213(a)(1).  An individual employed in a “bona fide administrative capacity” is 
someone: 
(1) Compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not 
less than $455 per week . . . exclusive of board, lodging 
or other facilities; 
 
(2) Whose primary duty is the performance of office or 
non-manual work directly related to the management or 
general business operations of the employer or the 




(3) Whose primary duty includes the exercise of 
discretion and independent judgment with respect to 
matters of significance. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 541.200.
3
  The parties agree that Swartz was paid in excess of $455 per 
week.  This appeal centers on the second and third requirements. 
 Swartz argues that his primary duties were not directly related to 
Windstream’s management or general business operations.  An employee’s 
primary duties are directly related to his employer’s management or general 
business operations when the employee “perform[s] work directly related to 
assisting with the running or servicing of the business.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a).  
Windstream is a telecommunications provider; its business is to sell 
telecommunications systems.  Swartz did not sell these systems himself.  Rather, 
he assisted with the sales by custom-designing telecom systems to meet each 
prospective customer’s unique needs.  In this manner, Swartz’s primary duty 
constituted work that serviced Windstream’s core business—the sale of telecom 
systems.  Requirement two of the “administrative employee exemption” was 
therefore satisfied.     
 The third “administrative exemption” requirement states that the employee’s 
                                                 
3 Under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), the Secretary of Labor is empowered to define the FLSA’s 
exemptions.  Regulations promulgated pursuant to this congressional delegation “have 
controlling weight unless found to be arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  
Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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primary duty must include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment 
with respect to matters of significance.  Department of Labor regulations explain 
that “the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison 
and evaluation of possible courses of conduct, and acting or making a decision 
after the various possibilities have been considered.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).  
Windstream’s customer base was varied; it included, for example, major hospitals, 
banks, and law firms.  Each customer’s needs varied with the nature of its business.  
It fell to employees such as Swartz to assess these unique needs and to design 
telecommunications systems to meet them.  In so doing, Swartz had access to a 
sizable product portfolio line.  The inclusion (or exclusion) of different products in 
different combinations naturally impacted the ultimate sales price.  Swartz’s goal 
was to find the right combination of products at a price the customer was willing to 
pay.  This task required him to compare and evaluate discrete options, and to make 
a decision after he had considered each possibility.  Swartz’s duties thus included 
the exercise of discretion and independent judgment.   
In sum, Swartz met the three criteria required to fall within the 
administrative exemption of the FLSA.  He was not entitled to overtime pay. 
III 
 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Swartz was not the subject 
of age discrimination and was not entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.  The 
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order of the Magistrate Judge granting Windstream’s motion for summary 
judgment will be affirmed. 
